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[2] that a merger was 
and duties under a judg-
of the parties, and there 
is no evidence to the the trial court's conclusion that 
merger was not intended on the Supreme Court. 
[3] Id.-Merger.-Where an has been incorporated into 
a it is as a thereof as if recited therein 
in haec verba; it is of consequence that the agreement is 
complete in itself since it loses its identity in the decree. 
[4] Marriage-Annulment--Decree-Merger of Agreement in De-
cree.-A settlement agreement which is merged in 
an annulment decree is not lacking in potency to support the 
execution process because the precise terms of the husband's 
not appear on its face; while the 
decree state with the amount to be paid, 
it is sufficient if the amount may be ascertained by 
of the such as parties' agree-
to their for judgment 
.Judg-
342; 
122 FousT v. FousT [47 C.2d 
[5] Contempt-Nature of Proceeding.-Contempt proceedings are 
criminal in nature, and the prescribed procedural safeguards 
must be accorded the alleged contemner. 
[6] !d.-Judgment or Order-Recitals.-The prime purpose of 
contempt proceedings is punishment for disobedience of a 
valid order directing performance of a specified act, and lia-
bility for such drastic punishment should not rest on implica-
tion or conjecture but rather on an order expressing in clear, 
specific and unequivocal language the act required. 
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los 
Angeles County quashing execution and restraining sheriff 
from selling property. Philbrick McCoy, Judge. Reversed. 
Richard A. Ibanez for Appellant. 
Herman Wildman for Respondent. 
SPENCE, J.-Defendant appeals from an order quashing 
execution and restraining the sheriff from selling plaintiff's 
property. The only question to be determined is whether a 
property settlement agreement had been so merged into an 
annulment decree that its provision for monthly payments 
became an operative part thereof, enforceable by execution. 
'l'he trial court held that it had not but the record does not 
sustain its ruling. 
The parties separated 14 years after their marriage. 
Plaintiff husband then commenced this action for ''annul-
ment of marriage and determination of property rights.'' 
Defendant wife cross-complained for divorce and the settle-
ment of property rights. Thereafter and on July 21, 1943, the 
parties entered into a property settlement agreement and 
stipulated that an annulment decree might be entered declar-
ing the marriage null and void from its inception. The prop-
erty settlement agreement provided, among other things, that 
plaintiff pay defendant $50 a month for life or until h0r 
remarriage. The agreement was attached as an exhibit to 
the stipulation, and both documents were filed with th0 
court. The annulment decree was entered July 22, 1943. 
Following the wording of the stipulation, the decree ordered 
and adjudged: ''That the properties and property rights of 
[5] See Oal.Jur.2d, Contempt, §§ 2, 53; Am.Jur., Contempt, § 67. 
[6] See Cal.Jur.2d, Contempt, § 72 et :sNj.; Am.Jur., Contempt, 
§ 78. 
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plaintiff and defendant herein are settled and dis-
tributed as per the terms and conditions of that certain 
.AGREEMENT dated July 21st, 1943, executed by plaintiff and 
defendant herein, a full and true copy of which .AGREEMENT 
is on file herein attached to said Stipulation marked 'Exhibit 
"A," ' and which is hereby approved by the Court and by 
this reference embodied in and made a part of this Judgment.'' 
Plaintiff failed to make the prescribed payments and became 
indebted to defendant in the sum of $2,405. Upon affidavit 
setting forth plaintiff's default, defendant procured the issu-
ance of a writ of execution on June 21, 1954. After levy had 
been made by the sheriff on plaintiff's property, plaintiff made 
a motion to quash the writ, based upon his affidavit reciting 
the circumstances of the parties' agreement. Both parties 
in their affidavits referred to the agreement as ''embodied 
in and made part of the judgment.'' The court granted the 
motion, thereby holding that the parties' agreement had not 
merged in the decree so as to be enforceable by execution. 
\V e have concluded that the trial court's order granting the 
motion must be reversed. 
[1] The nature of the agreement, its attachment to the 
stipulation for judgment, the filing of both documents with 
the court, and the plain language of the stipulation and the 
judgment entered thereon make the conclusion inescapable 
that merger was intended, thereby substituting rights and 
duties under the decree for those under the agreement. (See 
Rest., Judgments, § 47, com. a; Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Ca1.2d 55, 
58 [265 P.2d 865] ; Hmtgh v. Hough, 26 Cal.2d 605, 609-610 
[160 P.2d 15] ; 1 Armstrong, California Family Law, pp. 
810-811.) [2] Since there is no evidence to the contrary, 
the trial court's conclusion that merger was not intended is 
not binding on this court. (Fox v. Fox, 42 Cal.2d 49, 52 
[265 P.2d 881] ; Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 352 [131 P.2d 
825] .) 
It was held in the Flynn case that incorporation of a prop-
erty settlement agreement into a decree by reference does not 
preclude a merger. (Flynn v. Flynn, supra, p. 59.) 
[3] When an agreement has been incorporated into a decree, 
it is as effectively a part thereof as if recited therein in haec 
verba. It is of no consequence here that the agreement was 
complete in itself, for it lost its identity in the decree. It is 
now the decree that declares the rights and obligations of 
the parties, for it ''ordered and adjudged . . . that the prop-
60±, 612 
500, 506-507 
86, 92 P. 
C.,J.S. § 
; Shields v. 
While thr~ 
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act. Lia-
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required. v. Cou1·t, supra, p. 164.) It 
was therefore said in the Flynn case that ''greater certainty 
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merger >vas effected makes the certain to 
render it enforceable execution. To hold otherwise would 
require the to f'ngage in needless further litigation to 
merge the into another decree or judgment in order 
to obtain the enforcement thereof any process. Such 
idle act should not be 
The order from is reversed. 
Gibson, C. and pro * con-
CUITed. 
the property settlement 
in the annulment 
decree that its payments are enforce-
able by the issuance of a writ of execution on the decree. The 
property settlement ·was attached as an exhibit to 
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·was null and void from the hn.-.iv"o'"''"" 
provided: "That the 
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tributed as per the terms and conditions of that certain .AGREE-
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It is said in the majority opinion, relying upon the case 
of Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Cal.2d 55 [265 P.2d 865], that "'l'he 
nature of the agreement, its attachment to the stipulation for 
judgment, the filing of both documents with the court, and 
the plain language of the stipulation and the judgment en-
tered thereon make the conclusion inescapable that merger was 
intended, thereby substituting rights and duties under the 
decree for those under the agreement.'' The judgment in 
the case under consideration contains no order of any kind 
save the order that the marriage of the plaintiff and defendant 
is "hereby annulled and decreed null and void from its 
inception.'' In the Flynn case, supra, the interlocutory decree 
specifically provided that "defendant is hereby ordered to 
make all of the payments provided therein [agreement] to be 
paid by him ... and plaintiff and defendant are hereby 
ordered to comply in all respects with each and all of the 
terms and provisions of said agreement and to perform all 
their obligations thereunder as therein provided." In that 
case a majority of this court said (at page 58) : ''The question 
to what extent, if any, a merger has occurred, when a separa-
tion agreement has been presented to the court in a divorce 
action, arises in various situations. Thus, it may be necessary 
to determine whether or not contempt will lie to enforce the 
agreement, whether or not other judgment remedies, such as 
execution or a suit on the judgment are available, whether 
or not an action may still be maintained on the agreement 
itself, and whether or not there is an order of the court that 
may be modified under the provisions of section 139 of the 
Civil Code. 
''In any of these situations it is first necessary to determine 
whether the parties and the court intended a merger. If the 
agreement is expressly set out in the decree, and the court 
orders that it be performed, it is clear that a merger is 
intruded. (Plummer v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.2d 158, 165 
[124 P.2d 5]; Lazar v. Superior Court, 16 Cal.2d 617, 620 
[107 P.2d 249] .) ... In the absence of an express order 
to perform all or part of the agreement, it may be difficult 
to determine whether or not a merger was intended." 
I, of course, am firmly of the opinion that if the decree 
does not embody the agr·eement either in substance or in haec 
verba, or unless a copy of the agreement is physically attached 
to the decree, it is not an operative part of it and may not be 
enforced as a part of the deeree. "'I'his is trne PYen though 
the agreement may have been introduced in evidence and 
Oct. 1 FousT v. FousT 
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approved the couri. If the 1s introduced 
in eYidenee as an !'Xhibit, as it nndnnbiedl~· was here [ 42 
Cal.2d , it could be withdrawn or dc'stroyed and 
interested parties could not, by searching the records of the 
court 'construct a complete picture of the rights and obliga-
tions of the parties' (Pn'ce v. Pr·ice, 85 Cal.App.2d 732, 735 
[194 P.2d 101] .' 
J<Jxhibits may he, and as a matter of practice usually are, 
withdrawn, and thus are no longer a matter of record which 
may be ''inspected.'' ·when Exhibit ''A'' in the instant case 
is withdrawn there is nothing whatsoever in the judgment to 
show the rights and liabilities of the parties. In a case such as 
this, where there is no incorporation and no order of the 
court directing compliance with any of the provisions of the 
agreement, any action for relief must be on the agreement 
itself which should be accorded the same dignity as other 
contracts, but not the same dignity as a judgment of a court 
of record. There are here no ''directions in a decree or 
judgment" (Painter v. Berglund, 31 Cal.App.2d 63, 69 [87 
P.2d 360]) ; there was no order to comply with the provisions 
(Jf a settlement agreement in the decree (Di Corpo v. Di Corpo, 
33 Cal.2d 195, 201 [200 P.2d 529] ; Cochrane v. Cochrane, 
57 Cal.App.2d 937, 938 [135 P.2d 714]; Shields v. Shields, 
55 Cal.App.2d 579, 582 [130 P.2d 982]) ; the decree did not 
date with certainty the amount to be paid plaintiff (28 Cal. 
Jur.2d, § 76, p. 710), and since exhibits are ordinarily with-
drawn, the amount to be paid would be a matter of speculation 
and conjecture. Why not just take the complaining party's 
word for what the defendant owes~ The majority holding 
here will lead to endless difficulty-affidavits and counter-
affidavits will have to be filed setting forth the terms of the 
property settlement agreement since those terms are not 
matters of record. In every instance, since the majority has 
held, and continues to hold, that it is a question of fact whether 
ihe court and the parties intended an incorporation, that 
matter will have to be determined and then redetermined by 
an appellate court and finally by this court which can say, 
blandly and without even a tinge of conscience, that "Since 
there is no evidence to the contrary, the trial court's conclusion 
[or the appellate court's conclusion] that merger was not 
intended is not binding on this court. (Fox Y. Fox:, 42 CaL2d 
49, 52 [265 P.2d 881] ; Estate of Platt, 21 Cal.2d 343, 352 [131 
P .2d 825].) " It is obvious from the concluding paragraph 
of the majority opinion that even the majority of this court 
implication and may be 
the execution process is involved. , implication, 
we are to assume that execution may be utilized indulging 
in conjecture and speculation even there is no clear, 
specific and decree. No other 
conclusion can be reached facts of this case are 
taken into consideration. 
In the instant case, as has been heretofore noted, the 
property settlement was attached merely to the 
stipulation-not to the the agreement and 
stipulation were described as Exhibit ''A.'' \V e said in Bank 
of America v. Stan.dard Oil 10 Cal.2d 94 [73 P.2d 
903], that" As between the and the ranch company, 
the judgment which is now on is an adjudication 
that the owners of the bonds originally secured by the deed 
of trust, or their successors, are entitled to the trust fund 
as against other claimants. It does not completely fix the 
liability of the petitioner to the ranch company. 'A final 
decree in equity must state in plain figures the amount 
which a party must pay in the way both of debt or damages 
and costs, as well as every other matter adjudicated.' [ Cita-
tions.] ·when the amount is not so stated and does not 
appear in the it cannot be supplied by an 
affidavit submitted ex The court had no 
authority to order a writ of execution to issue upon the facts 
stated in the affidavit made on behalf of the ranch company 
and its vvrit should be recalled." It was also said: "Before an 
execution may properly issue the judgment must be for money 
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I desire to emphasize that this proceeding was commenced 
by the application by Mrs. Poust for a citation directed to 
Mr. Poust to show cause why he should not be punished for 
contempt for failure to pay past due support payments 
provided for in a property settlement agreement incorporated 
by reference in the annulment decree. .~::\ citation for contempt 
was signed by a judge of the superior court and the matter 
was referred to a commissioner. It was doubtless obvious to 
the trial court that the proceeding was not properly one in 
contempt for the reason that no order of court had been 
violated. However, a writ of execution was issued for the 
amount of the delinquent payments as shown by the affidavit 
of Mrs. Foust. This amount could be ascertained only by 
an examination of that document and the property settlement 
agreement in which Mr. Foust had agreed to pay $50 per 
month during the life of Mrs. Foust or until her lawful 
remarriage. Nowhere in the decree is there an order that 
Foust pay a definite or any sum of money as support or 
for such other purpose, nor is there any provision in the 
decree to carry into effect or directing compliance with the 
property settlement agreement. There was therefore no order 
or judgment of the court upon ·which execution could issue, 
and the order quashing the writ should be sustained. 
